Description: Models are imperfect approximations of reality. Once a bubble has been recognized, that’s the time for mechanisms of caution and prudence to kick in, even in the face of exuberance – especially in the face of exuberance. Liquidity and trust is plentiful until it’s not – it can evaporate with blazing speed and only returns slowly. Risk is contagious, which means every single employee and citizen has a vested interest in taking on the role of chief risk officer.

Description: Financial crises are nothing new. What is unique and sobering is the far greater speed with which the current situation has evolved from a weakening of the U.S. housing market into a full-blown, global economic meltdown. Also new this time is how quickly the fallout spread beyond the financial sector into all areas of the economy. Advanced communications and information technologies are creating an era of greater risk with more serious and far-reaching consequences when compared with even the recent past.

Description: As one highly rated financial firm after another blows up, what is the right conclusion to draw about enterprise risk management ERM? Does the financial crisis of 2008-09 demonstrate its criticality, or does it bring the whole concept into disrepute?

Description: The problem facing risk distributors is that product pricing is sticky, whereas the market price of risk can be quite volatile. This disconnection can become particularly severe during market downturns. The problem facing risk insurers is maintaining market share in benign market conditions when the market price of risk is low. Strategies that are dynamic with respect to time are difficult in practice, since they require more capital in volatile markets.

Description: Various ingredients contributed to the current financial crisis, and we can learn many lessons from the crisis. Yet rather than myopically focus on the particular minutiae of the current circumstances, we ought to pay special attention to those central issues that underpin the current crisis, past crises and future crises. Focus is on risk adjusting reported profits.

Description: Political figures and journalists have tended to blame deregulation and greed for the credit crisis. However, we would like to suggest that these were not the primary cause of the credit crisis. The real cause of the crisis was faulty regulation and arrogance. Flawed regulation in the over-reliance on complicated capital models and arrogance in believing that the complex mathematical formula in risk models overcame the limitations on input availability and enabled companies to capture returns that were greater than the cost of capital, have led Wall Street by creating CDOs and similar instruments to repackage risks and take out the systematic excess risk charges as profits, and have also allowed companies to run “prudently” on leverage ratios that were in hindsight over the limit.

Description: With the possible exception of full faith and credit debts of the United States, every loan carries some risk with it regardless of the borrower, and this risk varies depending on the creditworthiness of the person or institution that is supposed to repay the debt. Bearing that risk requires some sort of capital, both as a legal requirement and as evidence of good sense in lending, but recently we seem to have forgotten the basic relationship between a loan and the capital associated with it. The lesson of the current debacle is, or certainly ought to be, that the risk inherent in a financial transaction cannot be made to go away by the mere act of repackaging that transaction and renaming it.

Description: The upside of the downturn is that these powerful, influential, connected and important, yet incompetent people can be removed from their positions. To quote a great insight of Ayn Rand: “There is no substitute for competence.”

Description: The new ways of calculating capital requirements are relatively untested. We may be witnessing the results of such a test today. As of this writing, the global economy is almost surely entering a serious recession. One of the reasons for this appears to be inadequate capital provisioning. The failure of capital regimes to protect financial entities and, by extension, their customers has had unfortunate effects on the markets and economies of the world.

Description: The crisis has spread due to a systematic failure of the regulatory system. Over the last 20 years, regulations that fostered market stability were eliminated and new financial instruments were allowed to propagate without any real oversight. Instead of bailing out weak financial firms, we should be liquidating them. All doubtful asses need to be written-downs. We need accurate and transparent accounting.